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In this paper we try to justify our way of looking for an alternative approach to quantum me-
chanics, which is based on a non-classical logic. We consider two specific questions related
to quantum theory, namely, entanglement and the indiscernibility of quanta. We characterize
individuals, and then explain in what sense entanglement is a concept which can be applied to
individuals in a restricted sense only. Then, we turn to indiscernibility and, after realizing that
this concept is of a fundamental importance, we mention the ‘traditional’ theory of identity
(TTI) of standard logic and mathematics, which underly the basic formalism of quantum the-
ory. Then we propose to call the Problem of Identity the question whether identity of objects
can be justified, and under what conditions. As in the Hume’s celebrated Problem of Induction,
we conclude that the attribution of transtemporal identity to an object (either a macroscopic
or a microscopic one) has no logic justification, and must be considered as a metaphysical hy-
pothesis. Numerical identity is also put aside for similar reasons. Then we guess that identity
is just an useful concept, but which in certain fields, mainly in the quantum realm, could be
substituted by a weaker concept of indiscernibility. This assumption motivates us to look for
an interpretation of quantum mechanics based on a non-classical logic, termed non-reflexive,
and the corresponding mechanics is called non-reflexive quantum mechanics.
Keywords: non-reflexive logic, foundations of quantum mechanics, entanglement, non-individuality,
quasi-sets, identity of objects, indiscernibility.
Introduction Many time ago, Protagoras guessed that “Man is the measure of all things”.
As usually read, this dictum (apparently) says that things are just invention of men and, in
some sense, there is no reality out of phenomena. But there might be a second reading of his
claim; things and their ‘measures’ are just schemes we can form of an independent reality,
whose existence we don’t need to put aside but whose ‘real nature’ remains veiled to us
(cf. [d’Es.83, p.19]). The most successful ‘schemes’ are of course those advanced by the
relevant physical theories, and if we embark in a ‘naturalized’ metaphysics,1 agreeing that
it would be suspect to read our ontology off our the best theories, we should acknowledge
∗ Partially supported by CNPq (300122/2009-8).
1. We may take this notion in the following sense: “[b]y this [naturalized metaphysics] we mean a metaphysics
that is motivated exclusively by attempts to unify hypothesis and theories that are taken seriously by contemporary
science” [Lad.07, p.1].
1
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that “whoever tries to form and idea of the world (. . .) has to take the findings of quantum
physics most seriously into account.” [d’Es.03, p.xvi].
Of course we could just dismiss the search for an understanding of the supposed underlying
reality as a second order question, as some physicists do; the Nobel Prize winner Stephen
Weinberg, for instance, said that “[o]nce again I repeat: the aim of physics at its most
fundamental level is not just to describe the world but to explain why it is the way it is.”
[Wei.93, p.175]. That is, questions of ontology would not concern physics itself. Similar
things could be said of the Copenhagen interpretation, mainly in what regard Bohr’s and
Pauli’s stances, to whom the very notion of science does not necessitate of an underlying
reality. In fact, as said d’Espagnat, for Bohr science “seems to be a syntesis of that part of
human experience that is communicable to any human being. In his view the concept of
reality is secondary to such an objective” [d’Es.83, pp.17]. But we as philosophers can of
course do otherwise and be interested in looking to the forms of the world these theories
face us.
In special, we may turn to some specific questions, and here I underly two of the most dis-
tinctive traits of quantum theory, namely, the notion of entanglement, and the indiscerni-
bility of quanta. Firstly we need to explain in what sense entanglement is a concept which
can be applied to individuals only in a restricted sense. To do this we need to characterize
individuals and circumvent some interpretations of quantum mechanics, such as Bohm’s
theory (which involves entanglement in a sense and is a theory of individuals). Then, we
turn to indiscernibility; after realizing that this concept is of a fundamental importance, we
briefly discuss the notion of identity as ascribed by standard logic and mathematics, which
underly the basic formalism of quantum theory. Then we propose to call the Problem of
Identity the question whether identity of objects (either macroscopic or microscopic) can
be logically justified; this is to be taken similarly as Hume’s Principle of Induction, namely,
the question whether inductive inferences are justified, and under what conditions [Pop.02,
p.4]. As in the case of induction, we conclude that the attribution of a permanent identity to
an object has no logical justification, and must be considered as a metaphysical hypothesis.
This motivates us to look for an interpretation of quantum mechanics based on a non-
classical logic, termed non-reflexive, in which the traditional theory of identity (TT) does
not hold in full. The corresponding mechanics is called non-reflexive quantum mechanics.
Entanglement Roughly speaking, entanglement is a property of the quantum state of
a system containing at least two objects, which are linked in such a way that we cannot
adequately describe the state of any member of the system without mentioning the states
of the other members as well, and this is so even if the objects are far away separated. As
Schrödinger said when introduced this concept,
“When two systems, of which we know the states by their respective rep-
resentation, enter into a temporary physical interaction due to known forces
between them and when after a time of mutual influence the systems separate
again, then they can no longer be described as before, viz., by endowing each
of them with a representative of its own. I would not call that one but rather
the characteristic trait of quantum mechanics.” (apud [Acz.01, p.70])
Hence, once entangled, even if they become apart again, two systems cannot any more be
identified by a which is which criterion. The differences to ‘classical’ objects can be put as
follows. Suppose you have two or more white cricket balls which look completely alike.
Even you put them together in a container, a trained eye may distinguish one selected ball,
and even if you divert your gaze for a moment, in principle you can continue to follow your
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ball, for they are distinct individuals. Contrariwise, if the balls were quantum objects, when
merged (technically, when superposed or entangled), you don’t have n balls anymore, but
a white glob in which there is no more individual elements. Let us explore a little this idea.
Firstly, we should realize that quantum mechanics is not just formalism. It encompasses an
interpretation. To contrast, we shall consider two of them, namely, the Copenhagen inter-
pretation –the ‘standard’ interpretation– and Bohm’s interpretation. In short, according to
the Copenhagen interpretation (there are variants of this view we shall not consider here)
quantum mechanics has the following characteristics: (1) the physical state of the consid-
ered system is completely described by the wavefunction |ψ〉; (2) a system possess a certain
property only if |ψ〉 is an eigenvector of the corresponding Hermitian operator representing
the property; (3) the wavefunction evolves deterministically according to the Schrödinger
equation, but sometimes (4) the wavefunction |ψ〉 collapses in a way we generally don’t
now how, and (5) the dynamics is so that if two quantum systems begin in identical states,
they may end up in completely different states; we say that the dynamics is stochastic
rather than deterministic. In Bohm’s theory, the |ψ〉 function does not provide a complete
description of the state, but the system may have other properties, such as position. These
additional parameters are called hidden variables; the system has definite properties even
if |ψ〉 is not an eigenvector of the corresponding operator, and the dynamics evolves de-
terministically, including the hidden variables. Finally, there is no collapse due to previous
condition, and systems with the same wavefunction may differ by hidden parameters. The
formalisms of the standard view and Bohm’s differ a little, but they agree in the relevant
parts that interests us here, so that in speaking in the formalism, we can treat them jointly.
According to the formalism, if |ψ1〉 describes the state of the first system and |ψ2〉 describes
the state of the second (note that these wavefunctions label the objects), then the joint sys-
tem is given by |ψ12〉 = 1√2 (|ψ1〉|ψ2〉 ± |ψ2〉|ψ1〉) in the Dirac notation, where, as it is well
known, the plus sign holds for bosons while the minus sign holds for fermions. This wave-
function is either symmetric (plus sign) or anti-symmetric (minu sign) under permutation
of the two quanta, but its square, namely, |ψ12|2, which gives the relevant probabilities, re-
mains the same, so, the wavefunction |ψ12〉 ‘confounds’ the labels and the quanta are taken
as indiscernible, and while this wavefunction continues to express the state of the joint sys-
tem, no identificacion of the quanta is possible; they got entangled. For instance, the two
quantum systems would be the two electrons (which are fermions) of an Helium atom in the
fundamental state. There, we know that one of then has spin UP and the another one has spin
DOWN in a given direction, but it is impossible (according to standard quantum mechan-
ics) to tell which is which. Furthermore, according to most interpretations of the theory,
we cannot even say that there is some hidden parameter which, once known, could provide
the distinction. Both in the standard interpretations (Copenhagen view) and in Bohmian
mechanics, respectively either there are no such hidden parameters or they remain hidden,
and cannot be known. In both cases the impossibility of knowing which is which remains.
Let us call an individual whatever object having at least the following characteristics: (i) it
has its own peculiar characteristics (properties an relations with other objects), and at least
one of them is not partaken by any other individual; (ii) it is a continuant, that is, even if
some of its properties and relations change with time, we can still regard them as being the
same object as before; (iii) if an individual enter in a crowd with other individuals, even
if we cannot even more identify it (such as an ant we were pursuing and which entered
the anthill), even so it retains its individuality, being (in principle) distinct from any other
individual. We clearly see in these claims the link with the notion of identity.
The ontology of Bohm’s theory admits particles on a pair with their classical twins (de-
scribed by classical physics). These particles have always well defined positions and tra-
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jectories (although hidden), so the theory is compatible with an ontology of individuals,
and so Bohmian mechanics is compatible with the idea that the individuality of the under-
lying entities (pace, Weinberg) exist, yet veiled. The same happens sometimes in standard
mathematics, when we know that certain entities are distinct but cannot express the differ-
ence by a formula (the case of two least elements of two disjointed sets of real numbers
according to some well ordering is a paradigmatic example).2 So, we really can keep the
standard logic (and mathematics) intact in treating these questions, but at the expenses of
introducing hidden parameters. No problem if we adopt such a view. Bohmian mechanics
is a fantastic subject, and it is considered as experimentally equivalent with the standard
view. But let us turn to our second concept, namely, identity.
Identity and Individuality In quantum physics, the indiscernibility of quantum objects
(whatever they are, particles or fields) is a fundamental concept; without assuming it, we
cannot obtain the results of quantum mechanics (we cannot revise the reasons here —see
[Sch.09] for instance, and below— but just recall the importance of the concept for getting
the periodic table of the elements for instance). What is indiscernibility? Well, we may say
that two objects a and b are indiscernible relatively to a certain property P if both a and b
share P, that is, if and only if P(a)↔ P(b). This of course can be generalized both to more
properties and to n-ary relations. We say that a and b are absolutely indiscernible if and only
if they share all their properties and relations. Quantum mechanics considers two quantum
objects (particles, say) as identical in the first sense, being the selected properties called
intrinsic (independent of state), such as electric charge, momentum, and spin. Mathematics
treats identity in the second sense; this definition of identity is called Leibniz Law. The two
concepts do not exclude one another; once we regard intrinsic properties as some of the
properties an object may have, there is always space for other (perhaps ‘hidden’) properties
and relations not considered in the discussion. This is precisely what happens when we treat
indiscernibility within a ‘classical’ framework, such as the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory
(ZF), which encompasses classical logic.3
Thus, we can mimic indiscernibility in ZF for instance by means of an equivalence relation
and consider the elements of a same equivalence class as indiscernible. But this is just
a trick, similar to the assumption of hidden parameters. Really, within ZF, once classical
logic holds, any two objects are either identical (in the Leibnizian sense mentioned above)
or distinct, although in this last case they may partake some common characteristics (thus
being just relatively indiscernible). Technically, we may say that we can consider certain
mathematical structures (built in ZF) which are non-rigid so that, once we work within
those structures, we can regard some objects as indiscernible relative to all the predicates
and relations defined in the structure. This is essentially Hermann Weyl’s approach (see
[FrKr.06]) and it is consonant with the standard approach to quantum theory either. In
fact, once the underlying logic of quantum mechanics is classical logic (basically, ZF), all
2. Since we shall make reference to this example later, let me explain it a little bit more. In ZFC, the Zermelo-
Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice, we can prove that any set admits a well ordering (a total order
so that every non-empty subset has a least element –an element less than any other of the subset); by the way,
this proposition is equivalent to the axiom of choice. So, the set R of real numbers admits a well ordering (really,
infinitely many of them), let us call it R. Now, let (0, 1) and (2, 3), given in the usual order, be two disjoined
subsets of R. Thus, they have least elements, and of course they are distinct. The problem is that we cannot define
the ordering R by a formula of ZFC, so we cannot name these least elements either. Anyway, the standard theory
of identity continues to hold, so, we can assure that they are distinct, yet we cannot point the distinction.
3. We shall not discuss here the different possible formulations of ZF; Leibniz Law is a second order expression,
and usually ZF is based on a first-order language. These details were considered elsewhere and do not interfere in
the argumentation presented here —see [FrKr.06].
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entities are individuals, for any non-rigid structure can be extended to a rigid one.4
In other words, standard logic and mathematics describe individuals, yet we can simulate
indiscernibility by using some tricks. Quantum mechanics does it by assuming symmetry
postulates. Roughly speaking, only symmetric and anti-symmetric wavefunctions represent
physical states, and the mean value of the measure of any observable does not change after
a permutation of ‘identical’ quanta.
The Problem of Identity In Bohmian mechanics, identity is hidden. In such a mechanics
particles are individuals in the above sense, having well defined positions and trajectories
in any instant of time, and these confers them identity trough time. But position is a hidden
variable, so it is identity (hence so it is the individuality of the particles). Here things happen
more or less as the least elements of disjoined intervals of the reals mentioned above; we
know that they are different, but we cannot express this difference in the theory. In Bohmian
mechanics, the wavefunction |ψ〉 of a quantum system evolves according to the determinis-
tic Schrödinger equation, but its actual positions obey a Guiding Equation, something that
does not exist in the standard presentations of the theory. Bohmian mechanics shows that
a quantum mechanics which accounts for all the phenomena of non-relativistic quantum
mechanics and involving hidden variables is possible [Gol.09]. Thus, why not to keep with
this solution?
Our reasons can be summed up as follows. David Hume regarded in his Treatise [Hum.85]
the re-identification of objects in time (persons, say) as being consequence of habit (see
[KrAr.06] for a resume of his ideas on this point). We could say, in parallel with his problem
of induction (see the discussion on his Problem of Induction in [Pop.02]), that despite we
attribute a continuity to the existence of a certain object, which by hypothesis is no more
present to our senses, there seems to be no logical basis for we to assert that the object
observed again and resembling that object which was present to our senses before, is the
same object we have experienced before [Hum.85, Book I, Part IV, Section II]. In short,
like induction, identity trough time has no rational justification, as we have seen above in
the context of a quotation from Schrödinger in regarding quantum objects.
What about numerical identity? As usually conceived, numerical identity “is a relation ev-
erything has to itself and to nothing else” [Noo.09]. But, as Noonan observes, the notion
of ‘nothing else’ presupposes numerical diversity, so this definition is redundant. Numer-
ical identity is then defined either by Leibniz Law (in higher-order logics) or implicitly
by reflexivity and substitutivity axioms in first-order logic (with the addition of the axiom
of extensionality in set theories). But this is just TTI discussed above, and it entails that
any object is an individual in the sense already discussed. If we regard this theory as valid
for quantum objects, indiscernibility can be considered only as relative to some chosen
attributes (relative indiscernibility), so either we take (as physicists do) this particular con-
cept as standing for identity (contrariwise to TTI) or we need to accept the existence of
hidden parameters which, yet not effectively, can confer numerical identity to the consid-
ered entities. Physics works quite well with each of these options, but the philosophy is bad
with both of them, and no answer satisfies someone looking for a different metaphysics
(see below). Identity is a useful concept in mathematics. It would be something completely
strange if your number two was not the same as my number two when we are discussing
4. Rigid structures have only one automorphism, the identity function. Non-rigid structures may have other
automorphisms, and two entities are indiscernible from the point of view of the structure if and only if there is
an automorphism which leads one of them in the another. So, in a rigid structure, an object is indiscernible only
from itself, according to TTI.
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arithmetics. No problem for in mathematics we (apparently) don’t need to question TTI, yet
we can do it for fun (and perhaps some application can be found later). But in the empirical
sciences, if we assume TTI in the underlying logic, the only concept of indiscernibility we
can use if that of relative indiscernibility, and so we will not be able to consider a meta-
physical option which, following the forerunners of quantum theory, sees quantum objects
as non-individuals, that is, as entities devoid of individuality (a bad name indeed, but with
a long tradition) which, in our account, means to be devoid of identity. By the way, this is
our way to approach the issue: we propose that the standard notion of identity (TTI) can be
applied to objects in general, except in some particular cases. Our motivation, explained in
full elsewhere, comes from Schrödinger, and we shall not touch this point again here (see
[FrKr.06] for details).
Roughly speaking, non-individuals are entities that may have properties, may enter in rela-
tions with other non-individuals and with other objects. They can be aggregated in amounts,
or collections having a cardinal, but when they are indiscernible (and sometimes they are
not), no identification among them is possible even in principle, which means that no hid-
den parameters are presupposed to exist (and which confers them a radical difference to
the least real numbers of our above example). Hence, non-individuals may or may not be
indistinguishable; they are indistinguishable when partake all their properties and relations.
But, since TTI does not hold, this does not entail that they are the very same object. In this
case, they are absolutely indiscernible. Can we give some examples? Yes, we can. For in-
stance, think of a BEC, a Bose-Einstein condensate. To get the general idea, let us quote an
article from Scientific American (March 23, 2010):5
“In June 1995 our research group at the Joint Institute for Laboratory Astro-
physics (now called JILA) in Boulder, Colo., succeeded in creating a minus-
cule but marvelous droplet. By cooling 2,000 rubidium atoms to a temperature
less than 100 billionths of a degree above absolute zero (100 billionths of a de-
gree kelvin), we caused the atoms to lose for a full 10 seconds their individual
identities and behave as though they were a single ‘superatom.’ ” [CoWi.10]
Of course we need to look this phrase with a grain of salt, but it exemplifies our previous
example of the cricket balls. The claim that the rubidium atoms lose their individuality is
completely in agreement with which has been accepted by theory in this case. As Wolfgang
Ketterle, one of the Nobel Prize winners —shared with the authors of the above mentioned
article— for the experimental discover of the BECs [Ket.07] says,
“[i]f we have a gas of ideal gas particles at high temperature, we may imag-
ine those particles to be billiard balls (. . .). They race around in the container
and occasionally collide. This is a classical picture. However, if we use the
hypothesis of de Broglie that particles are matter waves, then we have to think
of particles as wave packets. The size of a wave packet is approximately given
by the de Broglie wavelength λdB, which is related to the thermal velocity
v of the particles as λdB = h/mv. Here m is the mass of the particles and h
Plancks constant. Now, as long as the temperature is high, the wavepacket is
very small and the concept of indistinguishability is irrelevant, because we can
still follow the trajectory of each wavepacket and use classical concepts. How-
ever, a real crisis comes when the gas is cooled down: the colder the gas, the
lower the velocity, and the longer the de Broglie wavelength. When individ-
ual wave packets overlap, then we have an identity crisis, because we can no
5. The interested reader will find interesting informations at an informal level at the BEC Homepage, http:
//www.colorado.edu/physics/2000/bec/.
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longer follow trajectories and say which particle is which. At that point, quan-
tum indistinguishability becomes important and we need quantum statistics.”
(op.cit.)
But, if we regard TTI as holding for the elements of a BEC, as we have seen above, we
need either to accept the existence of hidden properties, that is, properties which would
distinguish the elements from one each other, or their indiscernibility is only relative. The
second alternative is not what physics tells us; the elements of a BEC are absolutely indis-
cernible. The first alternative is something we can do, but it is not in agreement with all
interpretations which deny hidden variables. We prefer to investigate a third alternative, one
which changes the metaphysics (and the ontology), a metaphysics of non-individuals, but
which is compatible with the assumptions and with the formalism of quantum mechanics,
both relativistic and non-relativistic (cf. [FrKr.06]).
Non-Reflexive QM As we have seen, the idea that quantum objects would be non-
individuals goes to some of the forerunners of quantum physics (see [FrKr.06] for a detailed
discussion). When I speak of quantum objects (being them non-individuals of not), I am
not necessarily guessing that quantum theory should be committed to particles in the usual
sense of the world (small bodies having individuality). Really, quantum objects may be
fields, propensities, whatever you wish. For instance, there is a long tradition (which goes
at least to Schrödinger) in denying the existence of particles —see [Bit.07]. Paul Teller
proposed to change the idea of n particles by the notion of having a propensity do display
n quantum states (ibid.). But, we could ask: states of what? I tend to agree with Sunny
Auyang in that “[p]hysical theories are about things” [Auy.95, p.152], and that even field
theories may contain the means to refer. Thus, I am not discussing here the very nature of
non-individuals, but just proposing that the very basic entities to which quantum theories
refer, yet implicitly, could be treated as entities devoid of individuality. I have taken this
idea quite seriously from the mathematical and logical points of view. Long time ago I
began the development of a mathematics based on such an assumption, namely, seeing the
basic objects in the sense that the notion of identity does not hold to them. In this theory,
termed quasi-set theory (there are also some higher-logics based on the same motivations,
termed ‘Schrödinger logics’ —cf. [FrKr.06]), there are collections (quasi-sets) having a
cardinal, but not an associated ordinal. Thus we can regard more properly the collection
of 2,000 rubidium atoms seen above as a quasi-set instead of a standard set of, say ZF
(since, as it is well known, informally speaking, a set is a collection of distinguishable ob-
jects). In some recent works, my colleagues and I began the study of a quantum mechanics
grounded on such formalism [DHKr.08], [DHKK.10], yet some ideas had been advanced
before —see [FrKr.06] for the previous story.
In the remaining of this paper, I would like to advance some few ideas in a direction not
touched yet, and which I intend to develop further in another work. In special, I propose
to consider a quite radical idea already touched upon above, namely, that identity is just a
useful concept, essential in mathematics, but which in the empirical sciences could be sub-
stituted (with certain advantages, as we have seen) by a weaker concept of indiscernibility.
I found myself double motivated for proposing such an idea; firstly, I agree with Hume
in that identity os objects can be ascribed only by habit, and I guess that this holds also
for quantum objects (in agreement with some ideas advanced by Schrödinger when he still
believed in particles; see [KrAr.06]). Secondly, my fears in stressing a so apparently crazy
hypothesis were put aside when I found Wolfgang Pauli considering another quite strange
idea (to our common sense view of the world grounded on classical physics), namely, that
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even macroscopic bodies could not have —at any time— a well-determined or even an
almost determined position, and that the diffraction experiments on macroscopic objects
would be conceivable in principle (cf. [d’Es.83, p.21]). Interesting enough, the diffraction
phenomenum was recently realized with ‘big’ objects (big for the quantum scale), the C60
and C70 fullerene molecules [A.et.99]. Thus, standing on these giant’s shoulders, I try to
balance myself and look for an alternative approach to quantum theory, strongly grounded
on non-individuality and on a non-classical logic. Since such a logic, namely, quasi-set
theory, is a kind of non-reflexive logic, we call the corresponding quantum mechanics non-
reflexive.
Here I can’t develop the details, and this is of course not my intention either. But let me
say only that within quasi-set theory we can develop all the mathematics we can build in
ZF. So, all the standard formalism of quantum theory can be considered as done, and all we
need to do is to define the relevant concepts which involve indiscernible non-individuals.
We do it in terms of the Fock space formalism, by constructing two Fock spaces which
differ by their inner products [DHKr.08]. The first is a Fock space for ‘fermions’, and
the second for ‘bosons’. Of course this terminology has no meaning from the mathematical
point of view, but resemble the basic entities found in quantum theory, so we use them in the
intended interpretation. In our Fock spaces, there is no labeled quanta in any step, so they
are never ‘identified’ as individuals (say, by names or labels). The states refer only to certain
operators which play the role of occupation number operators and permutations of quanta
are unobservable (the mean value of the measure of any observable is the same before and
after a permutation of two indiscernible non-individuals). We have also exemplified the
use of this formalism to evaluate the correlations between the spin components of a two-
fermions system, explicitly showing that it is not necessary to first impose labels to the
particles and then masking the individuation by a symmetrization postulate to obtain the
usual results [DHKK.10].
Conclusion In this very short paper (maximum of 10 pages), I can’t explore in details
a so wide and and radical idea of questioning the standard notion of identity. But I hope
the reader have understood the general motivation that, to me, induces the development of
a non-reflexive quantum mechanics (NRQM). Let me end by emphasizing that this can of
course be done within a framework such as ZF, say by considering that the relevant relation
is an equivalence relation (indiscernibility), and getting the formalism in a ‘daydreamed’
non-reflexive logic. But this version of the NRQM does not satisfy me for, as I have en-
lighten, it would be nothing more that standard quantum theory in sheep clothes, since
identity continues to hold in the logical background and so only relative indistinguishabil-
ity can be considered. What I propose is a radical change, by abandoning identity, and by
basing NRQM on a different (non-classical) formal mathematical system, quasi-set theory.
The full development of NRQM is still in its beginnings, but even if no new physical result
will be achieved, at least from the conceptual point of view we have gains in understand-
ing the role of identity and individuality in this realm, so as in general. In fact, identity is
a so inlaid concept (interesting enough that logicians don’t fear any more in questioning
non-contradiction, the excluded middle and other ancient philosophical and metaphysical
concepts . . .) that apparently the only way of investigating its strength in quantum theory
is by trying to find some other way of interpreting this theory in terms of some formalism
which simply does not consider identity anyway. Let us see the future results.
EBL-2011 - Krause 9
References
[Acz.01] Aczel, A. D. [2001], Entanglement: The Greatest Mystery in Physics, New
York: Four Walls Eight Windows.
[A.et.99] Arndt, M., Nairz, O., Vos-Andreae, J., Keller, C., van der Zouw, G.,
Zeilinger, A. [1999], ‘Wave-particle duality of C60 molecules’, Nature, V.401,
14 Oct. 1999, 680-2.
[Auy.95] Auyang, S. [1995], How is Quantum Field Theory Possible?, Princeton:
Princeton Un. Press.
[Bit.07] Bitbol, M. [2007], ‘Schrödinger against particles and quantum jumps’, in
Evans, J. and Thorndike, A. S. (eds.), Quantum Mechanics at the Crossroads:
New Perspectives from History, Philosophy and Physics, Berlin and Heidel-
berg: Springer, 81-106.
[CoWi.10] Cornell, E. A. and Wiemann, C. E. [2010], ‘The Bose-EInstein Condensate’,
Scientific American, March 23.
[d’Es.83] d’Espagnat, B. [1983], In Search of Reality, New York: Springer.
[d’Es.03] d’Espagnat, B. [2003], Veiled Reality: An Analysis of Present-Day Quantum
Mechanical Concepts, Westview Press.
[DHKr.08] Domenech, G., Holik, F. and Krause, D. [2008], Q-spaces and the foundations
of quantum mechanics, Foundations of Physics 38 (11), 969-994.
[DHKK.10] Domenech, G., Holik, F., Kniznik, L, and Krause, D [2010]., ‘No labeling
quantum mechanics of indiscernible particles’, Int. J. Theor. Phys. 49 (12),
pp. 3085-3091.
[FrKr.06] French, S. & Krause, D. [2006], Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosoph-
ical, and Formal Analysis, Oxford: Oxford Un. Press.
[Gol.09] Goldstein, S. [2009], ‘Bohmian Mechanics’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/
spr2009/entries/qm-bohm.
[HuVi.10] Huggett, N. and Vistarini, T. [2010], ‘Entanglement Exchange and Bohmian
Mechanics’, Manuscrito v. 33, n. 1, 223-242.
[Hum.85] Hume, D. [1985], Treatise of human nature, 2nd. Ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge. Ox-
ford: Oxford Un. Press.
[Ket.07] Ketterle, W. [2007], ‘BoseÐEinstein condensation: identity crisis for indis-
tinguishable particles’, in Evans, J. and Thorndike, A. S. (eds.), Quantum Me-
chanics at the Crossroad: New Perspectives from History, Philosophy, and
Physics, Berlin-Hiddelberg: Springer, pp.159-182.
[KrAr.06] Krause, D. and Arenhart, J.R.B. [2006], ‘Hume, Schrödinger, e a individu-
ação de objetos físicos’, Revista Eletrônica Informação e Cognição, v.5, n.2,
59-71.
[Lad.07] Ladyman, J., Ross, D., Spurrett, D. and Collier, J. [2007], Every Thing Must
Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, Oxford: Oxford Un. Press.
[Noo.09] Noonan, H. [2009], ‘Identity’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http:
//plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity/.
[Pop.02] Popper, K. R. [2002], The Logic of Scientific Discover, London and New
Yourk: Routledge.
[Sch.09] Schiller, C. [2009], Motion Mountain: the Adventure of Physics, Part
IV: Quantum Theory: The Smallest Change. Available at http://www.
motionmountain.eu.
[Wei.93] Weinberg, S. [1993], Dreams of a Final Theory: The Search for the Funda-
mental Laws of Nature, London: Vintage.
